Nouvelles des ports

aquarelle marine - marine watercolor

Rafiots et compagnies

aquarelle marine cargo au mouillage - marine watercolor cargo ship at anchor

Nouvelles des escales

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L'Écho de Paris 20 juillet 1923 (art. page une)


Inter-allied debts and French claims

A precedent to invoke (1823-1923)

For the observer who follows, in its development, the question of inter-allied accounts, the speech delivered on June 26, in Salt Lake City, by President Harding to recommend to the debtor nations of the old world to imitate England by having their debts, gives full meaning to the arrival, announced in London, of the extremely wealthy Mr. Mellon, Secretary of the American Treasury. This trip is a further step in the search for a definitive settlement of these accounts through an agreement between the two main creditors. We know that the British Prime Minister, Sir Stanley Baldwin, since the liquidation of the English debt, the terms of which he established in Washington, has omitted no opportunity to celebrate this contract as a precedent which dominates the entire problem. France, in particular, must understand, according to him, that it must either pay its debt, as England has just done, or accept a new abandonment of its debt on Germany, in exchange for the English discharge.
These intimations, which under the compliments of style take on an increasingly peremptory tone, have nothing that could surprise For a long time now, - for our part, we have been worrying about the enormous weight which the two American and British claims weigh on our foreign policy and on our credit, we recommend the creation of a French debt capable of counterbalancing them. This belief is based on the fact that France was the battlefield of a series of wars which were pursued for distinct national interests and were only linked together by the noble emulation of heroism and by the necessary coordination in the movements of armies to triumph over the same enemy.
To be clearer, let's present the question as it is. arises for France in the form of a dilemma. One of two things, either the series of wars which continued against Germany, on French soil, was common to the three great co-belligerents, France, England, United States, or it was not. In the first case, this community of efforts involves the pooling of costs (that is to say: Anglo-Saxon commercial subsidies, to which responds the French land returned, pulverized for the benefit of all, pooling which logically leads to the reciprocal extinction of debts. However, this conclusion is rejected by our creditors.

From then on and this is the second case, this series of wars is broken down into three wars, politically separated by their origins and their goals, as the spokespersons of our allies and associates have proclaimed a hundred times: ("We made our own war"). These juxtaposed wars having no cohesion between them except through the strategic link, through the technical agreement essential on the military level to achieve a victory which could only be common. Here the special position of France emerges.
Two of these wars, the Anglo-German war and the German-American war, having continued on French soil, the result is for our country the right to oppose the claims of its former allies and associates, without repudiating them, of course, a counterclaim debt likely to absorb them. Indeed, when the United States, in turn, entered the struggle, in the third year of the conflict, the commercial debts contracted by England with them, since the start of hostilities, had already reached £700-800 million. From this moment, when the debts increased, no territorial counterpart was registered due to the American association, with the English assets. In France, on the contrary, this counterpart, emerging from our first ruins, grows with the credit of our British ally, and continues to round out with it until around the armistice. This is because the United States did not wage its war on the soil of England, its debtor, but in France, and that, for its part, England waged its own, to an immense extent, not in England, nor in Germany, but in France as well, that is to say in the territory of a debtor who finds herself as a creditor of her creditors. There is a fact which must be taken into great account: it is that the participation of the American flags in the great melee, alongside ours, does not constitute the entire American war. Nearly an entire year passed between the declaration of war of the United States (April 6, 1917) and the appearance of their first divisions on the line of fire. This preliminary phase, while quivering America multiplied its preparations, Germany, from the first moment, multiplied its blows. Precipitous destruction of Imperial Russia, liberation of 50 German divisions on the eastern lines, desperate rushes with this reinforcement to the west, against the Franco-English rampart (450 kilometers for British troops, 450 kilometers for French troops).

This is how Germany fought its new adversary on a front from which, despite itself, it was absent. These French debts, which could be called "patrimonial", because they reflect the damage inflicted on the heritage par excellence, the land, would be set up by a parliamentary commission whose investigation would be based on the archives of our states. -majors and on the files of our disaster-stricken regions, with possible recourse to the League of Nations. Nothing would be more normal, even now, than to open such a procedure. No one, in fact, whether a people or an individual, is supposed to renounce their right. We can therefore be surprised by the affirmative tone which animates Sir Stanley Baldwin's comments on the Anglo-American settlement, as if this were an unanswerable precedent. This example cannot be used as authority against us. There is, however, a precedent in British accounting, not against us, but for us, and to which we have a fortiori the right to refer.
During the first coalitions brought together against France by the English government, from 1795 to 1800, the court of Vienna contracted three successive loans in England. These loans were never repaid and bore interest from year to year which, when added together, raised the total figure in 1823 to 500 million francs. We must not forget that at this time England was still weighed down by a debt of 20 billion francs, formed during the wars it fomented against the Republic, the Consulate and the French Empire. Nevertheless, by virtue of the agreement reached on that date with the court of Vienna, the latter obtained the remission of nine|tenths of its debt and found itself discharged in return for two million pounds sterling, without having to pay this benefit of no abandonment, and after having been showered with largesse by its allies, at the congress of 1815...
We cannot accept the idea that the British Treasury has double standards, depending on whether England fought on the side of France or on the side of its enemies. Can we suppose for a single moment that in the heart of our neighbors across the Channel, Marne is less expensive today than Waterloo was in the past? As we can see, significant reductions are to be obtained on the debt of our allies. A discount on the British debt will, in fact, have a certain repercussion on that of the United States, which could not remain behind its English partners, because these two titles are in solidarity with each other. Without a concerted agreement, each of them weighs on our franc, on our national life, with a double weight. Any sacrifice affecting one will automatically be coupled with a sacrifice of the other. After which, what may remain of these charges, on our credit instantly raised, will cease to belong to the arsenal of artifices and political resources which are used against us, and will reintegrate the purely financial domain, in the more peaceful where, between accountants, the “Must and Have” of the Great State Books is adjusted.

PAUL LEFAIVRE

Minister Plenipotentiary